Abstract. Cryptographic hash functions obtained by iterating a round function constructed from a block cipher and for which the hash-code length is twice the block length m of the underlying block cipher are considered. The computational security of such hash functions against two particular attacks, namely, the free-start target and free-start collision attacks, is investigated; these two attacks differentiate themselves from the "usual" target and colliiion attacks by not specifying the initial value of the iterations. The motivation is that computationally secure iterated hash functions against these two particular attacks implies computationally secure iterated hash functions against the "usual" target and collision attacks. For a general class of such 2m-bit iterated hash functions, tighter upper bounds than the one yet published in the literature on the complexity of free-start target and free-start collision attacks are derived. A proposal for a am-bit iterated hash function achieving these upper bounds is made; this new proposal is shown to be computationally more secure against free-start target and free-start collision attacks than some of the already proposed schemes falling into this general class. It is also shown that our proposal is better than the present proposal for an I S 0 standard in the sense that both schemes achieve these upper bounds but one encryption is required in our proposal for hashing one m-bit message block as opposed to two encryptions in the I S 0 proposal. Finally, two new attacks on the LOKI Double-Block-Hash function are pIesented with lower complexities than the known ones.
M ) = hash(H0, M ) ; ( H o , M ) but hash(fi0, &) = hash(H0, M ) .
When the messages M and fi contain only one block, i.e., n = n = 1, we have hash(li0, M ) = round(H0, M ) , from which it follows that each above attack reduces to an attack of the same type on the m-bit round function. We will consider iterated hash functions based on (m, k) block ciphers, where an ( r n , k ) block cipher defines, for each k-bit key, a reversible mapping from the set of all m-bit plaintexts onto the set of all m-bit ciphertexts. Given an (rn, k) block cipher, we write Ez(X) to denote the encryption of the m-bit plaintext X under the k-bit key 2 , and Dz(Y) to denote the decryption of the rn-bit ciphertext Y under the k-bit key 2. In our discussion, we will always assume that the (m,k) block cipher has no known weaknesses. We define the rule of such an iterated hash function (or equivalently, of an round function) as the number of rn-bit message blocks processed per encryption or decryption.
Given that the rn-bit round function is based on an (m, k) block cipher, we define the complezily of an attack as the total number of encryptions or decryptions of the ( m , k) block cipher required for this attack, e.g., an attack requiring 2* encryptions or decryptions is said to have complexity 2" Because an attack on the rn-bit round function implies an attack of the same type on the corresponding m-bit iterated hash function with roughly the same complexity, the design of computationally secure round functions is a necessary (but not suficient) condition for the design of computationally secure iterated hash functions. Moreover, under certain conditions (cf. [Merkle 90, Damgaard 90, Naor 89, Lai 92] ), a computationally secure round function implies a computationally secure iterated hash function. We will therefore concentrate our attention to the design of computationally Secure round functions.
In Section 2 we will consider a general class of 2m-bit iterated hash functions of rate 1 based on an (m, m) block cipher. Several previously proposed schemes [Preneel 89, Quisquater 89, Brown 901 are shown to be in this class. For this class, we derive upper bounds on the complexities of free-start target and freestart collision attacks, by describing attacks that are better than the bruteforce attacks. In Section 3, we propose a 2m-bit iterated hash function which will be proven, under plausible assumptions, to achieve these upper bounds. Section 4 contains a new free-start collision attack using two encryptions on the LOKI Double-Block-Hash scheme [Brown 901 and a new semi-free-start collision attack requiring about 2m/2 encryptions. In Section 5 we investigate a class of 2m-bit iterated hash functions with rate 1/2. It is shown that the upper bounds derived in Section 2 also hold for this class of rate 1/2 hash functions. It then follows that both our proposal and the Meyer-Schilling scheme [Meyer 881 (which is presently under consideration for an IS0 standard [ I S 0 911) achieve the same computational security against free-start attacks; however, our proposal is more efficient in the sense that one encryption is required for hashing one m-bit message block as opposed to two encryptions in the Meyer-Schilling scheme.
2 wn-bit round functions with rate 1
In this section, we consider 2m-bit round functions with rate 1 based on (m, m) block ciphers, i.e., block ciphers with m-bit ciphertext-plaintext and mbit keys. with the symbol @ denoting bitwise modulo-2 addition.
Other similar proposals are the Preneel-Bosselaers-Govaerts-Vandewalle (PBGV) scheme proposed in [Preneel 891 and the Quisquater-Girault (QG) scheme proposed in [Quisquater 891 . and the attacks on the LOKI-DBH scheme that will be presented in this paper show that these proposals of 2m-bit round functions are in fact weaker than the underlying m-bit round function against free-start attacks. In order to give a systematic solution to this problem, we will consider the following general form of such 2m-bit round functions: 
T
The PBGV and QG schemes can also be represented in a similar way.
We now show upper bounds on the complexity of a free-start target and freestart collision attacks on 2m-bit iterated hash functions whose round function is of type (4).
Proposition 1: For the 2m-bit iterated hash function with rate 1 whose 2m-bit round function is of type (4), the complexity of a free-start target attack is upper-bounded by about 2m encryptions, and the complexity of a free-start collision attack is upper-bounded by about 2"12. Free-start target attack: For a given value of (Hi-l, If;-,, Mi', M:), we will find a different value of (Ht-l, H:-,, M f , M f ) yielding the same value of (Hf,H,?) according to (4). We proceed as followed: for the given value of (H:-l, H!-,, Mil, M?) we compute the value of (A, B , C > according to (5) and, using the above argument we produce 2" different values of H,?-l, Mil, M f ) yielding the same value for ( A , B , C ) . Thus, such an attack requires about 2"12 encryptions, which gives an upper bound of about 2"12 for the complexity of a free-start collision attack on the 2m-bit itetated hash function. Given the 2rn-bit iterated hash function hash(. , .) whose 2m-bit round function is of type (4), we say that hash(. , -) is optimum against a free-start target aliack when the best possible free-start target attack has complexity about 2m; similarly, hash(. , .) is said to be optimum against a free-start collision attack when the best possible free-start collision attack has complexity about 2m/2.
3 Proposal for a 2m-bit hash function with rate 1
In this section, we propose a new 2m-bit iterated hash function whose 2m-bit round function is of type (4). We will prove that this new proposal is optimum against a free-start target and free-start collision attacks.
Before introducing our proposal, we describe the m-bit iterated hash function which was proposed independently by Davies and Meyer, cf. [Davies 85, Matyas 85, Winternitz 84).
Davies-Meyer (DM) scheme:
This scheme consists of an m-bit iterated hash function as defined in (1) whose m-bit round function is based on an (m,k) block cipher. For our purpose, we will m u m e that Is = rn, i.e., the plaintext-ciphertext length and the key length are the same. Letting Hi-1 and Mi denote two mbit blocks, the rn-bit output Hi of the DM round function for the input pair
The DM scheme is generally considered to be secure, i.e., a free-start target and free-start collision attacks on (6) need about 2" and 2"i2 encryptions, respectively. Our proposal is based on the DM scheme:
Parallel Davies-Meyer (Parallel-DM) scheme: For the 2m-bit iterated hash function defined in (l), we propose the following 2m-bit round function with rate 1 based on an (rn, m, 1 block cipher: . In order to avoid trivial attacks based on the fact that a falsified message can have a different length from that of the genuine message, we defined the following strengthening on the iterated hash functions, which was proposed independently by Merkle and Damgaard, cf. [Merkle 90, Damgaard 901:
Merkle-Damgaard (MD) Strengthening: For the iterated hash function defined by (l), the MD-strengthening consists of specifying that the last block M, of the binary message M = ( M I , M2, . . . , M,,) to be hashed must represent the length of M (in binary form), i.e., the total length of ( M I , M2,. . . , Mn-l).
Proposition 2: Assuming that the DM scheme is secure and that the 2m-bit iterated hash function is used with MD-strengthening, it follows that the Parallel-DM scheme is optimum against free-start target and free-start collision at tacks. 
to the Parallel-DM round function defined in (7), we obtain the new 2m-bit round function From (8) we see that hi depends only on rn? and hi-l and, h! depends only on mi and h:.-l, which implies that hf and h: can be attacked separately. Moreover, we see from (8) that the equations for hi and hi 2 correspond each to the m-bit round function of the DM scheme defined in (6). By the assumption that the DM scheme is secure, it follows that the best possible free-start target and collision attacks on (8) require about 2" and 2m/2 encryptions, respectively. From the Transformation principle, viz. applying any simple (in both directions) invertible transformation to the input and to the output of the round function produces a new round function with the same computational security as the original one against free start attacks (cf. [Lai 92]), it follows that the best possible free-start target and collision attacks on the Parallel-DM round function defined by (7) require about 2m and 2"'12 encryptions, respectively. We describe here a new free-start collision attack on the LOKI-DBH scheme which requires two encryptions and a semi-free-start collision attack which uses about 2m/2 encryptions. These attacks can be applied to the LOKI-DBH scheme with any underlying (m, m) block cipher. Such low attacking complexities on the LOKI-DBH scheme have not yet being reported in the literature. Moreover, the low complexity of this new free-start collision shows that the LOKI-DBH scheme is not optimum against a free-start collision attack. F'ree-start collision attack: We will find two different values for (Hl-l, H?-lr Mil, Mi") yielding the same value for (H:, H,?) according to (3). We proceed as followed:
Step 1: We randomly choose an m-bit value x and two distinct m-bit values y and y. Step 3: By applying the inverse transformation of (9), we obtain two different values (z, z @ L, y @ z, 2 @ y @ z) and (2, x @ i, y @ 2 , z @ 9 @ 2) for Note that substituting (z, t @ z , y, y) for (H,'_,, H;-l, M / , Mi") in (3) , O ) , which proves the correctness of our attack. Because an attack on the round function implies an attack of the same type on the iterated hash function with the same complexity, we conclude that the above attack implies a freestart collision attack on the LOKI-DBH iterated hash function requiring two encryptions.
Semi-free-start collision attack: We will find a value for (H!-l, H,?-l) and two different values for (Mi', M f ) yielding the same value ( H j , If!) according to (3). We proceed as followed:
Step 1: We randomly choose an m-bit value x.
S t e p 2: Let z and i be defined by (11) and (12), respectively. Given 2, we randomly choose a pair (y,$) of two distinct m-bit values until we find a pair yielding matching z and i, i.e., z = i . By the usual "birthday argument", it takes about 2m/2 encryptions to have an 0.63 probability of finding such a pair (Y, Y).
Step 3: By applying the inverse transformation of (9) we obtain a value ( z , z@z) for (H/-l,H,?-l) and two different values ( y @ z , z $ y $ r ) and ( j i @ z , z $ y $ z )
By applying similar substitutions as for the free-start collision attack, one can easily prove the correctness of this attack. We then conclude that the just described attack implies a semi-free-start collision attack on the LOKI-DBH 2m-bit iterated hash function using about 2mf 2 . From Section 2, we know that the complexity of a 2m-bit iterated hash function with rate 1 whose round function is of type (4) is upper-bounded by about 2"' for afree-start target attack and by about 2"f2 for afree-start collision attack. We now show that the same upper-bounds hold for 2m-bit iterated hash function with rate 1/2 whose round function is of type (14).
Proposition 3: For the 2m-bit iterated hash function with rate 1/2 whose 2m-bit round function is of type (14), the complexity of a free-start target attack is upper-bounded by about 2"' and the complexity of a free-start collision attack is upper-bounded by about 2mf 2 .
Proof: We first consider the free-start target attack, i.e., for a given value of (Hi'-1, H:-. 1, Mi), we will find a different value for (Hi'-1 H:-l, H,?-,, Mi) according to where n-' denotes the inverse of the non-singular matrix n. When the matrix n is singular, there exist, for the value of ( A , B , C) obtained from the given value of (H:-1, Mi) yielding the same value for (A, B , C), i.e., the same value for Hi'. For the given and the 2m newly generated values of HiZ_l, M i ) , we compute the value of Hi" according to (14). Because there are 2" possible values of the rn-bit block H,?, it follows that one must compute H: for about 2"' different values of (H:-l, H:-I, Mi) to have an 0.63 probability of finding a value of (iY/-l, Mi) yielding the same value for Hi" as the given value of (H:-l, H!-l, Mi). Such an attack requires therefore about 2"' encryptions.
We now consider the free-start collision attack, i.e. we will find two different values of (H,!-l, H:-,, M i ) Thus, the upper bounds of Proposition 3 also hold for the Meyer-Schilling scheme. By applying the similar approach as in the proof of Proposition 2, we can show that the Meyer-Schilling scheme indeed achieves these upper bound if the underlying cipher has no weaknesses.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have derived upper bounds for the complexities of freestart target and free-start collision attacks on a large class of 2m-bit iterated hash functions based on an (m, m) block cipher. Eventhough these free-start target and free-start collision attacks are "non-real" attacks (because the initial value of the iterated hash function is usually fixed), their complexities give a lower bound for the complexities of "real" target and collision attacks, respectively.
We have also proposed a 2m-bit iterated hash function with rate 1 which, under the assumption that the DM scheme is secure and that MD-strengthening is applied, was proven to be optimum against free-start target and free-start collision attacks. Moreover, our new free-start collision attack on the LOKI-DBH scheme shows that this scheme is not optimum against a free-start target collision attack. Finally, even though the Meyer-Schilling 2m-bit iterated hash function is also optimum with respect to these two attacks, it only achieves a rate of 1/2, while our proposal achieves a rate of 1, i.e., two encryptions are needed in the Meyer-Schilling scheme to hash one rn-bit message block as opposed to one encryption for our proposal.
Since the m-bit Davies-Meyer scheme appears to be secure, it has been an open question [Preneel 93 , Lai 921 whether one can modify the DM scheme to construct a 2m-bit iterated hash function that is more secure than the original rn-bit DM scheme. This problem is partly solved by the results of Propositions 1 and 3, which show that, given a 2m-bit round function which hashes at least one rn-bit message block by using twice an rn-bit block cipher with an m-bit key, there always exist free-start attacks that are better than the brute-force attacks.
That is, by using any ( m , rn) block cipher twice plus some "simple operations" , it is impossible to obtain a 2m-bit round function of rate 1/2 or greater that is more secure than the rn-bit DM round function against free-start attacks. Thus, to obtain such a secure 2m-bit round function, one has to apply an (m, m) block cipher at least three times in each round, or, to use twice an m-bit block cipher with key length greater than rn. In fact, it appears that [Lai 921 secure 2rn-bit round functions of rate 1/2 can be constructed by using twice an rn-bit block cipher with a 2m-bit key.
